CVE-2023-52881: tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent

Ubuntu release	Source package	Vendor state	Fixed version	Evidence
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive	`linux-azure-fde`	Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition.	`Not published in this feed`	Canonical record ↗Source updated 11 Sept 2026
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive	`linux-raspi-realtime`	Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition.	`Not published in this feed`	Canonical record ↗Source updated 11 Sept 2026

Recommended actionWithin 72 hours

Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.

Patch available

What, why and how

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent This patch is based on a detailed report and ideas from Yepeng Pan and Christian Rossow. ACK seq validation is currently following RFC 5961 5.2 guidelines: The ACK value is considered acceptable only if it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <= SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back. It needs to be noted that RFC 793 on page 72 (fifth check) says: "If the ACK is a duplicate (SEG.ACK < SND.UNA), it can be ignored. If the ACK acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT) then send an ACK, drop the segment, and return". The "ignored" above implies that the processing of the incoming data segment continues, which means the ACK value is treated as acceptable. This mitigation makes the ACK check more stringent since any ACK < SND.UNA wouldn't be accepted, instead only ACKs that are in the range ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <= SND.NXT) get through. This can be refined for new (and possibly spoofed) flows, by not accepting ACK for bytes that were never sent. This greatly improves TCP security at a little cost. I added a Fixes: tag to make sure this patch will reach stable trees, even if the 'blamed' patch was adhering to the RFC. tp->bytes_acked was added in linux-4.2 Following packetdrill test (courtesy of Yepeng Pan) shows the issue at hand: 0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 1024) = 0 // ---------------- Handshake ------------------- // // when window scale is set to 14 the window size can be extended to // 65535 * (2^14) = 1073725440. Linux would accept an ACK packet // with ack number in (Server_ISN+1-1073725440. Server_ISN+1) // ,though this ack number acknowledges some data never // sent by the server. +0 < S 0:0(0) win 65535 <mss 1400,nop,wscale 14> +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <...> +0 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 65535 +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 // For the established connection, we send an ACK packet, // the ack packet uses ack number 1 - 1073725300 + 2^32, // where 2^32 is used to wrap around. // Note: we used 1073725300 instead of 1073725440 to avoid possible // edge cases. // 1 - 1073725300 + 2^32 = 3221241997 // Oops, old kernels happily accept this packet. +0 < . 1:1001(1000) ack 3221241997 win 65535 // After the kernel fix the following will be replaced by a challenge ACK, // and prior malicious frame would be dropped. +0 > . 1:1(0) ack 1001

What

Why

The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

Why

The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.

How

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation

Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.

No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material

Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.

None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path: a network path → vulnerable operation → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface: Network
Privileges required: None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction: None
Attack complexity: Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary: Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness ? CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration.: CWE not yet assigned
CVSS vector ? CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.
Post-exploitation / living off the land: No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.

NetworkUnauthenticated

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2023-59594Official EUVD mapping

0 linked advisory records.

Official EUVD record

BSI · German · WID-SEC-W-2024-1905IBM QRadar SIEM: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein entfernter, anonymer oder lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM QRadar SIEM ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, eine Man-in-the-Middle-Situation zu schaffen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen oder eine Denial-of-Service-Situation zu schaffen.

tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent

National CERT insights ?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

EUVD-2023-59594

What, why and how

Exploit reality and attack path

Official authority intelligence

Patch and workaround

Evidence and provenance

National CERT insights
?
CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.