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Full vulnerability report · 2024
CVE-2023-52478High confidence

HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect

Linux · Linux

8.8HighCVSS 3.1
Recommended action
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Fix availability varies by product
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityHighOperational priority:High, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • EPSS is 0.25% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
  • Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs Linux Linux and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 30 daysRemediation target: Within 180 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Cross-source reconciliation

Remediation availability differs by product scope

Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Distribution package intelligence

Release-specific package status

Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.

5 package states
Package result overrides the generic status

BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 1 affected package state shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.

Repository candidate not checked

A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.

Distribution releaseSource packageVendor stateFixed versionEvidence
Debian trixietrixie · sourcelinuxVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.6.5.8-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian bookwormbookworm · sourcelinuxVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.6.1.64-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian forkyforky · sourcelinuxVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.6.5.8-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian sidsid · sourcelinuxVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.6.5.8-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archivelinux-raspi-realtimeAffected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition.Not published in this feedCanonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Direct vendor intelligence

Authoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories

Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.

2 current
CVE-2023-52478 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 69 · interimSUSE Product Security TeamCVE-2023-52478
150 known affected

The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.

  • kernel-default as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-default-base as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-default-devel as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-default-man as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-devel as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-macros as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-source as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP2
  • kernel-default as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP4
  • kernel-default-base as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP4
  • kernel-default-devel as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP4
  • kernel-default-man as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP4
  • kernel-devel as component of SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 SP4
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect hidpp_connect_event() has *four* time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU) races when it races with itself. hidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs on probe() and if a "device-connected" packet is received by the hw when the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on the hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be started from the workqueue. This opens the following races (note the below code is simplified): 1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race): if (!hidpp->protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp->protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; } We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968: [ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them: 2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race): if (hidpp->name == hdev->name) { ... hidpp->name = new_name; } 3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!): hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp->battery.ps) return 0; probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */ hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); } 4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic): if (hidpp->delayed_input) return; hidpp->delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev); The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence: hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); ... hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace's pov but this is not even the really big problem. Notice how: 1. This is all devm-maganaged 2. The hidpp->battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies 3. hidpp->battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup() This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver: 1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered 2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp->battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory 3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data 4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp->battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one: Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ---truncated---
Remediation
To install this SUSE Security Update use the SUSE recommended installation methods like YaST online_update or "zypper patch".
SSA-613116 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · interimSiemens ProductCERTSSA-613116: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Components in SINEC OS before V3.1
3 known not affected

The vendor explicitly states that these products are not affected by this CVE.

  • RUGGEDCOM RST2428P (6GK6242-6PA00)
  • SCALANCE XC-300/XR-300/XC-400/XR-500WG/XR-500 family
  • SCALANCE XCM-/XRM-/XCH-/XRH-300 family
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect
Remediation
No remediation text is recorded.
Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2023-57103

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

ENISA has published the identifier mapping but no EUVD description has been stored yet.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
Not supplied in the stored EUVD record
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionPatch only the product branches with a verified fix

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Fix availability varies by product
01

What, why and how

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect hidpp_connect_event() has *four* time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU) races when it races with itself. hidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs on probe() and if a "device-connected" packet is received by the hw when the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on the hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be started from the workqueue. This opens the following races (note the below code is simplified): 1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race): if (!hidpp->protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp->protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; } We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968: [ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them: 2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race): if (hidpp->name == hdev->name) { ... hidpp->name = new_name; } 3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!): hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp->battery.ps) return 0; probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */ hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); } 4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic): if (hidpp->delayed_input) return; hidpp->delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev); The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence: hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); ... hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace's pov but this is not even the really big problem. Notice how: 1. This is all devm-maganaged 2. The hidpp->battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies 3. hidpp->battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup() This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver: 1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered 2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp->battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory 3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data 4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp->battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one: Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ---truncated---

What

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect hidpp_connect_event() has *four* time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU) races when it races with itself. hidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs on probe() and if a "device-connected" packet is received by the hw when the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on the hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be started from the workqueue. This opens the following races (note the below code is simplified): 1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race): if (!hidpp->protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp->protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; } We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968: [ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them: 2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race): if (hidpp->name == hdev->name) { ... hidpp->name = new_name; } 3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!): hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp->battery.ps) return 0; probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */ hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); } 4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic): if (hidpp->delayed_input) return; hidpp->delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev); The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence: hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); ... hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace's pov but this is not even the really big problem. Notice how: 1. This is all devm-maganaged 2. The hidpp->battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies 3. hidpp->battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup() This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver: 1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered 2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp->battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory 3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data 4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp->battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one: Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ---truncated---

Why

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

How

An attacker operating through an adjacent network may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.

What

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect hidpp_connect_event() has *four* time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU) races when it races with itself. hidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs on probe() and if a "device-connected" packet is received by the hw when the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on the hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be started from the workqueue. This opens the following races (note the below code is simplified): 1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race): if (!hidpp->protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp->protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; } We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968: [ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them: 2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race): if (hidpp->name == hdev->name) { ... hidpp->name = new_name; } 3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!): hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp->battery.ps) return 0; probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */ hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); } 4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic): if (hidpp->delayed_input) return; hidpp->delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev); The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence: hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); ... hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace's pov but this is not even the really big problem. Notice how: 1. This is all devm-maganaged 2. The hidpp->battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies 3. hidpp->battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup() This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver: 1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered 2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp->battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory 3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data 4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp->battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one: Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ---truncated---

Why

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

How

An attacker operating through an adjacent network may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
an adjacent network → Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition → disrupt the affected service
Attack surface
Adjacent
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-367 ↗

CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition. The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVAdjacentAttack vector: The attacker must be on an adjacent or logically close network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
UnauthenticatedDenial of serviceCWE-367
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

BSI · German · WID-SEC-2024-0511Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of Service und unspezifische Angriffe

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder einen nicht spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

Official advisory ↗
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20240306Security Bulletin 06 Mar 2024

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 06 Mar 2024, published on 6 March 2024. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2026-AVI-1165Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits IBM

d?id=CVE-2023-51074 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52428 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52428 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52451 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52451 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52463 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52463 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52464 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52464 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52469 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52469 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52470 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52470 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52471 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52471 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52476 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52476 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52478 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52478 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52486 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52486 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52492 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52492 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52522 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52522 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52530 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52530 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52560 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52560 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52615 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52615 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52619 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52619 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52622 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2025-AVI-1057Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits VMware

d?id=CVE-2023-52465 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52467 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52467 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52468 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52468 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52469 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52469 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52470 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52470 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52472 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52472 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52473 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52473 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52475 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52475 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52477 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52477 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52478 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52478 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52487 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52487 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52490 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52490 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52501 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52501 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52513 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52513 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52516 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52516 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52519 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52519 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52520 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52520 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52523 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2025-AVI-0677Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits Siemens

rd?id=CVE-2023-5178 Référence CVE CVE-2023-51780 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-51780 Référence CVE CVE-2023-51781 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-51781 Référence CVE CVE-2023-51782 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-51782 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52340 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52340 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52433 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52433 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52435 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52435 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52475 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52475 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52477 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52477 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52478 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52478 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52486 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52486 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52502 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52502 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52504 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52504 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52507 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52507 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52509 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52509 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52510 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52510 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52581 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52581 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52583 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2024-AVI-0821Multiples vulnérabilités dans le noyau Linux de Red Hat

d?id=CVE-2022-48687 Référence CVE CVE-2022-48754 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48754 Référence CVE CVE-2022-48760 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48760 Référence CVE CVE-2022-48804 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48804 Référence CVE CVE-2022-48836 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48836 Référence CVE CVE-2022-48866 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48866 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52439 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52439 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52470 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52470 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52476 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52476 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52478 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52478 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52522 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52522 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52605 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52605 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52683 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52683 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52817 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52817 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52840 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52840 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52880 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52880 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52884 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52884 Référence CVE CVE-2023-6040 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=C

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2024-AVI-0265Multiples vulnérabilités dans le noyau Linux de SUSE

d?id=CVE-2023-52449 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52451 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52451 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52452 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52452 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52456 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52456 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52457 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52457 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52463 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52463 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52464 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52464 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52467 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52467 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52475 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52475 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52478 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52478 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52482 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52482 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52484 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52484 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52502 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52502 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52530 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52530 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52531 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52531 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52532 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52532 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52559 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52559 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52569 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2024-AVI-0242Multiples vulnérabilités dans le noyau Linux de SUSE

d?id=CVE-2023-52451 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52452 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52452 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52456 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52456 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52457 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52457 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52462 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52462 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52463 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52463 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52464 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52464 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52467 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52467 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52475 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52475 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52478 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52478 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52482 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52482 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52484 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52484 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52502 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52502 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52530 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52530 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52531 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52531 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52532 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52532 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52559 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52559 Référence CVE CVE-2023-52569 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2023-027863Linux の Linux Kernel における Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) 競合状態の脆弱性

Linux の Linux Kernel には、Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) 競合状態の脆弱性が存在します。

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Fix availability varies by product
Affected
Fixed
Linux: < 3.19, 4.14.328 ≤ 4.14.*, 4.19.297 ≤ 4.19.*, 5.4.259 ≤ 5.4.*, 5.10.199 ≤ 5.10.*, 5.15.136 ≤ 5.15.*, 6.1.59 ≤ 6.1.*, 6.5.8 ≤ 6.5.*, 6.6 ≤ *
Action
Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. Limit untrusted access and use least privilege until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 29 Feb 2024 · Last source change 5 Aug 2026, 09:10 UTC · CWE-367 · Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2023-57103
Product sourceVendor CSAF · SUSE Product Security Team
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · SUSE Product Security Team
CWE sourceNIST NVD
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗

No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.

Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2023-52478 · cve.blacktree.nl