Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- Exploitation requires an existing local or physical foothold with privileges.
- EPSS is 0.69% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2023
CVE-2023-44392High confidence
Arbitrary code execution vulnerability when using shared Kubernetes cluster
garden-io · garden
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-HM75-6VC9-8RPR ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
8.3HighCVSS 3.1
Within 7 days
Patch availableHigh technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityHigh→Operational priority:Medium, lowered one band.downgradedsince 18 Sep 2024
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs garden-io garden and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch available01
What, why and how
Garden provides automation for Kubernetes development and testing. Prior tov ersions 0.13.17 and 0.12.65, Garden has a dependency on the cryo library, which is vulnerable to code injection due to an insecure implementation of deserialization. Garden stores serialized objects using cryo in the Kubernetes `ConfigMap` resources prefixed with `test-result` and `run-result` to cache Garden test and run results. These `ConfigMaps` are stored either in the `garden-system` namespace or the configured user namespace. When a user invokes the command `garden test` or `garden run` objects stored in the `ConfigMap` are retrieved and deserialized. This can be used by an attacker with access to the Kubernetes cluster to store malicious objects in the `ConfigMap`, which can trigger a remote code execution on the users machine when cryo deserializes the object. In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have access to the Kubernetes cluster used to deploy garden remote environments. Further, a user must actively invoke either a `garden test` or `garden run` which has previously cached results. The issue has been patched in Garden versions `0.13.17` (Bonsai) and `0.12.65` (Acorn). Only Garden versions prior to these are vulnerable. No known workarounds are available.
What
Garden provides automation for Kubernetes development and testing. Prior tov ersions 0.13.17 and 0.12.65, Garden has a dependency on the cryo library, which is vulnerable to code injection due to an insecure implementation of deserialization. Garden stores serialized objects using cryo in the Kubernetes `ConfigMap` resources prefixed with `test-result` and `run-result` to cache Garden test and run results. These `ConfigMaps` are stored either in the `garden-system` namespace or the configured user namespace. When a user invokes the command `garden test` or `garden run` objects stored in the `ConfigMap` are retrieved and deserialized. This can be used by an attacker with access to the Kubernetes cluster to store malicious objects in the `ConfigMap`, which can trigger a remote code execution on the users machine when cryo deserializes the object. In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have access to the Kubernetes cluster used to deploy garden remote environments. Further, a user must actively invoke either a `garden test` or `garden run` which has previously cached results. The issue has been patched in Garden versions `0.13.17` (Bonsai) and `0.12.65` (Acorn). Only Garden versions prior to these are vulnerable. No known workarounds are available.
Why
Untrusted data can cross into a code-evaluation path and be interpreted as executable instructions.
How
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.
What
Garden provides automation for Kubernetes development and testing. Prior tov ersions 0.13.17 and 0.12.65, Garden has a dependency on the cryo library, which is vulnerable to code injection due to an insecure implementation of deserialization. Garden stores serialized objects using cryo in the Kubernetes `ConfigMap` resources prefixed with `test-result` and `run-result` to cache Garden test and run results. These `ConfigMaps` are stored either in the `garden-system` namespace or the configured user namespace. When a user invokes the command `garden test` or `garden run` objects stored in the `ConfigMap` are retrieved and deserialized. This can be used by an attacker with access to the Kubernetes cluster to store malicious objects in the `ConfigMap`, which can trigger a remote code execution on the users machine when cryo deserializes the object. In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have access to the Kubernetes cluster used to deploy garden remote environments. Further, a user must actively invoke either a `garden test` or `garden run` which has previously cached results. The issue has been patched in Garden versions `0.13.17` (Bonsai) and `0.12.65` (Acorn). Only Garden versions prior to these are vulnerable. No known workarounds are available.
Why
Untrusted data can cross into a code-evaluation path and be interpreted as executable instructions.
How
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- local access → Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') → execute code or commands in the affected security context
- Attack surface
- Local
- Privileges required
- Low: a basic authenticated account is required
- User interaction
- Required interaction required
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Changed: exploitation can affect a different security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-94 ↗
CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'). The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVLocalAttack vector: The attacker needs local access to the vulnerable system.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UIRequiredUser interaction: Another user must perform an action for exploitation to succeed.SChangedScope: The attack can affect a component governed by a different security authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- After compromise, an attacker may use built-in shells, scripting engines, scheduled tasks and native network utilities for discovery, persistence or movement. This is a plausible LoTL path, not evidence that it has occurred for every attack.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Patch available
- Action
- Review the linked authoritative reference and apply the recorded fixed release appropriate to the affected product branch.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. Limit untrusted access and use least privilege until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 9 Oct 2023 · Last source change 18 Sept 2024, 20:23 UTC · CWE-94 · Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2023-48738
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.