BlackTreeIndependent security intelligence

Full vulnerability report · 2023

CVE-2023-40217High confidence

(The TLS connection cannot directly be used for data exfiltration because the vulnerable code path requires that the connection be closed on initialization of the SSLSocket.)

n/a · n/a

5.3MediumCVSS 3.1

Recommended action

Scheduled

Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.

Mitigation available

Direct vendor intelligence

Authoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories

Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.

1 current

2NGA002579 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 1 · finalABB Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)ABB Arctic communication solution ARM600 Vulnerabilities

2 known affected

The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.

ABB M2M Gateway ARM600, firmware versions >=4.1.2|<=5.0.3
ABB M2M Gateway SW, software versions >=5.0.1|<=5.0.3

Summary: If a TLS server side socket is created, receives data, and then closes quickly, there's a brief window where the SSLSocket instance detects it as "not connected" and won't initiate a handshake. Buffered data remains readable but unauthenticated if client certificate authentication is expected. This data is limited to the buffer size. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability for revealing sensitive information from the server.
Remediation: Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current

ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2023-44814

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

ENISA has published the identifier mapping but no EUVD description has been stored yet.

EUVD state: Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation: Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score: Not supplied in the stored EUVD record
Advisory evidence: No linked advisory details stored yet

Recommended actionScheduled

Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.

Mitigation available

What, why and how

An issue was discovered in Python before 3.8.18, 3.9.x before 3.9.18, 3.10.x before 3.10.13, and 3.11.x before 3.11.5. It primarily affects servers (such as HTTP servers) that use TLS client authentication. If a TLS server-side socket is created, receives data into the socket buffer, and then is closed quickly, there is a brief window where the SSLSocket instance will detect the socket as "not connected" and won't initiate a handshake, but buffered data will still be readable from the socket buffer. This data will not be authenticated if the server-side TLS peer is expecting client certificate authentication, and is indistinguishable from valid TLS stream data. Data is limited in size to the amount that will fit in the buffer. (The TLS connection cannot directly be used for data exfiltration because the vulnerable code path requires that the connection be closed on initialization of the SSLSocket.)

What

Why

The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

Why

The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.

How

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation

Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.

No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material

Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.

None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path: a network path → vulnerable operation → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface: Network
Privileges required: None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction: None
Attack complexity: Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary: Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness ? CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration.: CWE not yet assigned
CVSS vector ? CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CLowConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.INoneIntegrity impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land: No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.

NetworkUnauthenticated

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2023-44814Official EUVD mapping

0 linked advisory records.

Official EUVD record

BSI · German · WID-SEC-W-2024-0794Dell ECS: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Dell ECS ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erweitern, beliebigen Programmcode mit Administratorrechten auszuführen, Informationen offenzulegen, Dateien zu manipulieren, einen Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriff durchzuführen, Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen oder einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen.

(The TLS connection cannot directly be used for data exfiltration because the vulnerable code path requires that the connection be closed on initialization of the SSLSocket.)

National CERT insights ?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

EUVD-2023-44814

What, why and how

Exploit reality and attack path

Official authority intelligence

Patch and workaround

Evidence and provenance

National CERT insights
?
CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.