Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 1.44% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2023
CVE-2023-28842High confidence
moby/moby's dockerd daemon encrypted overlay network with a single endpoint is unauthenticated
moby · moby
Official source articles: GitHub GHSA-6WRF-MXFJ-PF5P ↗ · GitHub GHSA-GVM4-2QQG-M333 ↗ · GitHub GHSA-VWM3-CRMR-XFXW ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
6.8MediumCVSS 3.1
Scheduled
Patch availableMedium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityMedium→Operational priority:Medium, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs moby moby and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Distribution package intelligence
7 package statesRelease-specific package status
Alpine, Debian findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alpine v3.23v3.23 · community | docker | Vendor fix publishedAlpine records a security fix at this version. An absent entry does not mean the package is unaffected. | 23.0.3-r0 | Alpine Security Database ↗Source updated 11 Sep 2026 |
| Alpine v3.22v3.22 · community | docker | Vendor fix publishedAlpine records a security fix at this version. An absent entry does not mean the package is unaffected. | 23.0.3-r0 | Alpine Security Database ↗Source updated 11 Sep 2026 |
| Alpine v3.21v3.21 · community | docker | Vendor fix publishedAlpine records a security fix at this version. An absent entry does not mean the package is unaffected. | 23.0.3-r0 | Alpine Security Database ↗Source updated 19 Aug 2026 |
| Debian trixietrixie · source | docker.io | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 20.10.24+dfsg1-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | docker.io | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 20.10.24+dfsg1-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | docker.io | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 20.10.24+dfsg1-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | docker.io | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 20.10.24+dfsg1-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
Direct vendor intelligence
1 currentAuthoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
CVE-2023-28842 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · finalRed Hat Product Securitymoby: Encrypted overlay network with a single endpoint is unauthenticated
The vendor explicitly identifies these products or versions as containing the fix.
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:40d3711c6ff4339e3d204a4844b33a811c65acdc91def97e33e4af86aa989912_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:b87af8eaca79747f375ab8c43731cb058a7f0a9ec7d0375441c23c20be313336_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:ba0158716e20f72cf32db2bd94f6fb90d8cabca3a397d28b193e6b683f0ff28b_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:dfa9bd4985f298a0dad9b54aa89de1c3a3682854deb003d40d21d83553df676f_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:08ed3fc1b1a0b1480ee19691665c9430ce09b71a298bbf9ce723f59b91ec6cdc_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:653e08355de89b9801b16beacdc376528c76a1c632b8173333d02a13dae21f34_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:b77555f4cb29d22bce45c1f87db943101f65bb494ef4c6c40122f6037ffc0697_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:d0f872558d2ac8dca6a9ba292671dcd53834756e39043eb847a96c8bfa706677_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:66fca73be2187312ed07c1a873788b6c9dce4d7344cf2487a184ef1fd6430a4e_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:72e2916d8198e173d03b3b77593c95e5dbc385cada0a6549620e02251c905a3d_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:8eb1845a2f9904e5a12728bcaa2eea113f3a3b4b2e5e84f3f96a7a7ad7d59e84_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:9220b4c5e3489da9ce1ab3e07e35016a1aacc4a5c7fc6de9c634b6c8c39d49b5_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- Summary
- A vulnerability was found in Moby due to an unprotected alternate channel within encrypted overlay networks, which could allow a remote attacker to bypass security restrictions. By sending a specially crafted request, an attacker could inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.
- Remediation
- For multicluster engine for Kubernetes, see the following documentation for details on how to install the images: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_advanced_cluster_management_for_kubernetes/2.9/html/clusters/cluster_mce_overview#installing-while-connected-online-mce
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Patch available01
What, why and how
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
What
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
Why
The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
Why
The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Unprotected Alternate Channel → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- High: exploitation depends on specific conditions
- Security boundary
- Changed: exploitation can affect a different security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-420 ↗
CWE-420: Unprotected Alternate Channel. The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACHighAttack complexity: Successful exploitation depends on specific conditions outside the attacker's direct control.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SChangedScope: The attack can affect a component governed by a different security authority.CNoneConfidentiality impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Patch available
- Fixed
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:40d3711c6ff4339e3d204a4844b33a811c65acdc91def97e33e4af86aa989912_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:b87af8eaca79747f375ab8c43731cb058a7f0a9ec7d0375441c23c20be313336_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:ba0158716e20f72cf32db2bd94f6fb90d8cabca3a397d28b193e6b683f0ff28b_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/addon-manager-rhel8@sha256:dfa9bd4985f298a0dad9b54aa89de1c3a3682854deb003d40d21d83553df676f_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:08ed3fc1b1a0b1480ee19691665c9430ce09b71a298bbf9ce723f59b91ec6cdc_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:653e08355de89b9801b16beacdc376528c76a1c632b8173333d02a13dae21f34_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:b77555f4cb29d22bce45c1f87db943101f65bb494ef4c6c40122f6037ffc0697_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/agent-service-rhel8@sha256:d0f872558d2ac8dca6a9ba292671dcd53834756e39043eb847a96c8bfa706677_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:66fca73be2187312ed07c1a873788b6c9dce4d7344cf2487a184ef1fd6430a4e_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:72e2916d8198e173d03b3b77593c95e5dbc385cada0a6549620e02251c905a3d_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:8eb1845a2f9904e5a12728bcaa2eea113f3a3b4b2e5e84f3f96a7a7ad7d59e84_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/apiserver-network-proxy-rhel8@sha256:9220b4c5e3489da9ce1ab3e07e35016a1aacc4a5c7fc6de9c634b6c8c39d49b5_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-image-service-rhel8@sha256:4f14845f4e481ecb24ae857d82c2d12f2a3541cc011a9001d48a76a172aeaa9d_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-image-service-rhel8@sha256:969ef7d81b1b1f408e97ae7bf42bedcec86c153e3c4e1be38730541bd96628db_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-image-service-rhel8@sha256:e061f4fec4e4eee1668e11c473c31809bb9e0fb657ec6109ff0de08b64741f19_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-image-service-rhel8@sha256:f09dd8d7835b2ccd276be0961f7e88f99ba320b9561b5c3378fca3000a05d9c4_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-agent-rhel8@sha256:19578389becf299ed4102db2c069182b40a631c79e841b6f7d2e94392124c5c1_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-agent-rhel8@sha256:9290806a9c497eae1dfccd4922e613bbf9605c44ad879f3693f6283d1d73933f_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-agent-rhel8@sha256:ca8d86079cd97908146284f1da90964c78cae7b9e45b7f44fb4c3c5e44c0cfb2_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-agent-rhel8@sha256:f31ba22082439fdf1f6a438d3b837c13e8031c1742286c508364581193fd7cf7_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-reporter-rhel8@sha256:69581e8295001fedcdad382c4c09520e4642cff9b4ab166db65927b650285d53_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-reporter-rhel8@sha256:b1bfba85d2c6067229707b1a46a010420c0a34e895efc92ed25c90ecb0430b64_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-reporter-rhel8@sha256:b60541fe6e5019ac2b1b70196c7fb6bae25f8ce1dc935231b025911f348b8591_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-reporter-rhel8@sha256:ed81406ef743c04d911e2c7f8263703543349c40a8bc736b4f24bda671ddd6b1_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-rhel8@sha256:add3690609ff85c12aceb6f38bf694b7e78b8f0adcf7f59a4b0ff1489689af5b_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-rhel8@sha256:e6b55fe38c36a10ce8ff0ebd0b6dc21ae5a06e7cb6770f8d7e45d1f637d19e43_s390x as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-rhel8@sha256:ef96548bf355206bae018d326f1bd645f260f80081a7a1b3f48c2970ecd02b3e_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/assisted-installer-rhel8@sha256:fe881cadc0c5aa0fcbc70f9517e3f8058d275e6dbab289e9a96f7bb49c015024_ppc64le as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/aws-encryption-provider-rhel8@sha256:68e8e07d3fdd8d294d0bb4c3a1e99e90570d940eaaa044a248cea84d786a4515_arm64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- multicluster-engine/aws-encryption-provider-rhel8@sha256:a84a7a01663edcecc3b11fd9bff4ca1d5c4e535c8560da63c05a8b875690f364_amd64 as a component of multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8
- and 134 more
- Action
- For multicluster engine for Kubernetes, see the following documentation for details on how to install the images: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_advanced_cluster_management_for_kubernetes/2.9/html/clusters/cluster_mce_overview#installing-while-connected-online-mce
- Workaround
- A mitigation or workaround reference is available from the source linked below; validate it against the affected product and version.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 4 Apr 2023 · Last source change 13 Feb 2025, 16:48 UTC · CWE-420 · Unprotected Alternate Channel
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2023-1220
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- >= 1.12.0, < 20.10.24; >= 23.0.0, < 23.0.3 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- After
- >= 1.12.0, < 20.10.24; >= 23.0.0, < 23.0.3 · Fixed: For multicluster engine for Kubernetes, see the following documentation for details on how to install the images: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_advanced_cluster_management_for_kubernetes/2.9/html/clusters/cluster_mce_overview#installing-while-connected-online-mce
- Remediation statusRemediation status changed from Mitigation available to Patch available.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- Mitigation available
- After
- Patch available
CVE published
Mitigation reference recorded
Fixed release recorded from official guidance
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.