Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- Exploitation requires an existing local or physical foothold with privileges.
- EPSS is 0.29% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2025
CVE-2022-49509High confidence
media: i2c: max9286: fix kernel oops when removing module
Linux · Linux
7.1HighCVSS 3.1
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Fix availability varies by productHigh technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityHigh→Operational priority:Medium, lowered one band.downgradedsince 11 May 2026
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Linux Linux and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
- Canonical Ubuntu Security: 1 affected package state with no published fix
Distribution package intelligence
5 package statesRelease-specific package status
Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Package result overrides the generic status
BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 1 affected package state shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian trixietrixie · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 5.18.5-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 5.18.5-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 5.18.5-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 5.18.5-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-raspi-realtime | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product01
What, why and how
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: max9286: fix kernel oops when removing module When removing the max9286 module we get a kernel oops: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000aa00000094 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000880d85000 [000000aa00000094] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: fsl_jr_uio caam_jr rng_core libdes caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine max9271 authenc crct10dif_ce mxc_jpeg_encdec CPU: 2 PID: 713 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G C 5.15.5-00057-gaebcd29c8ed7-dirty #5 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : i2c_mux_del_adapters+0x24/0xf0 lr : max9286_remove+0x28/0xd0 [max9286] sp : ffff800013a9bbf0 x29: ffff800013a9bbf0 x28: ffff00080b6da940 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff000801a5b970 x22: ffff0008048b0890 x21: ffff800009297000 x20: ffff0008048b0f70 x19: 000000aa00000064 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000014 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff000802da49e8 x11: ffff000802051918 x10: ffff000802da4920 x9 : ffff000800030098 x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : fefefeff6364626d x5 : 8080808000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff x1 : ffff00080b6da940 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: i2c_mux_del_adapters+0x24/0xf0 max9286_remove+0x28/0xd0 [max9286] i2c_device_remove+0x40/0x110 __device_release_driver+0x188/0x234 driver_detach+0xc4/0x150 bus_remove_driver+0x60/0xe0 driver_unregister+0x34/0x64 i2c_del_driver+0x58/0xa0 max9286_i2c_driver_exit+0x1c/0x490 [max9286] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x94 el0_svc+0x28/0x80 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 The Oops happens because the I2C client data does not point to max9286_priv anymore but to v4l2_subdev. The change happened in max9286_init() which calls v4l2_i2c_subdev_init() later on... Besides fixing the max9286_remove() function, remove the call to i2c_set_clientdata() in max9286_probe(), to avoid confusion, and make the necessary changes to max9286_init() so that it doesn't have to use i2c_get_clientdata() in order to fetch the pointer to priv.
What
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: max9286: fix kernel oops when removing module When removing the max9286 module we get a kernel oops: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000aa00000094 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000880d85000 [000000aa00000094] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: fsl_jr_uio caam_jr rng_core libdes caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine max9271 authenc crct10dif_ce mxc_jpeg_encdec CPU: 2 PID: 713 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G C 5.15.5-00057-gaebcd29c8ed7-dirty #5 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : i2c_mux_del_adapters+0x24/0xf0 lr : max9286_remove+0x28/0xd0 [max9286] sp : ffff800013a9bbf0 x29: ffff800013a9bbf0 x28: ffff00080b6da940 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff000801a5b970 x22: ffff0008048b0890 x21: ffff800009297000 x20: ffff0008048b0f70 x19: 000000aa00000064 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000014 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff000802da49e8 x11: ffff000802051918 x10: ffff000802da4920 x9 : ffff000800030098 x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : fefefeff6364626d x5 : 8080808000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff x1 : ffff00080b6da940 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: i2c_mux_del_adapters+0x24/0xf0 max9286_remove+0x28/0xd0 [max9286] i2c_device_remove+0x40/0x110 __device_release_driver+0x188/0x234 driver_detach+0xc4/0x150 bus_remove_driver+0x60/0xe0 driver_unregister+0x34/0x64 i2c_del_driver+0x58/0xa0 max9286_i2c_driver_exit+0x1c/0x490 [max9286] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x94 el0_svc+0x28/0x80 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 The Oops happens because the I2C client data does not point to max9286_priv anymore but to v4l2_subdev. The change happened in max9286_init() which calls v4l2_i2c_subdev_init() later on... Besides fixing the max9286_remove() function, remove the call to i2c_set_clientdata() in max9286_probe(), to avoid confusion, and make the necessary changes to max9286_init() so that it doesn't have to use i2c_get_clientdata() in order to fetch the pointer to priv.
Why
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
How
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: max9286: fix kernel oops when removing module When removing the max9286 module we get a kernel oops: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000aa00000094 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000880d85000 [000000aa00000094] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: fsl_jr_uio caam_jr rng_core libdes caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine max9271 authenc crct10dif_ce mxc_jpeg_encdec CPU: 2 PID: 713 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G C 5.15.5-00057-gaebcd29c8ed7-dirty #5 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : i2c_mux_del_adapters+0x24/0xf0 lr : max9286_remove+0x28/0xd0 [max9286] sp : ffff800013a9bbf0 x29: ffff800013a9bbf0 x28: ffff00080b6da940 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff000801a5b970 x22: ffff0008048b0890 x21: ffff800009297000 x20: ffff0008048b0f70 x19: 000000aa00000064 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000014 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff000802da49e8 x11: ffff000802051918 x10: ffff000802da4920 x9 : ffff000800030098 x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : fefefeff6364626d x5 : 8080808000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff x1 : ffff00080b6da940 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: i2c_mux_del_adapters+0x24/0xf0 max9286_remove+0x28/0xd0 [max9286] i2c_device_remove+0x40/0x110 __device_release_driver+0x188/0x234 driver_detach+0xc4/0x150 bus_remove_driver+0x60/0xe0 driver_unregister+0x34/0x64 i2c_del_driver+0x58/0xa0 max9286_i2c_driver_exit+0x1c/0x490 [max9286] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x94 el0_svc+0x28/0x80 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 The Oops happens because the I2C client data does not point to max9286_priv anymore but to v4l2_subdev. The change happened in max9286_init() which calls v4l2_i2c_subdev_init() later on... Besides fixing the max9286_remove() function, remove the call to i2c_set_clientdata() in max9286_probe(), to avoid confusion, and make the necessary changes to max9286_init() so that it doesn't have to use i2c_get_clientdata() in order to fetch the pointer to priv.
Why
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
How
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- local access → Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Local
- Privileges required
- Low: a basic authenticated account is required
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-668 ↗
CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere. The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVLocalAttack vector: The attacker needs local access to the vulnerable system.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.INoneIntegrity impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- The issue can support a local privilege or sandbox boundary transition; normal system utilities may then be available in the gained context.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix availability varies by product
- Action
- Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. Limit untrusted access and use least privilege until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 26 Feb 2025 · Last source change 11 May 2026, 19:01 UTC · CWE-668 · Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceNIST NVD
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2022-54720
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceNIST NVD
NVD statusNVD enriched
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.