Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.25% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2020
CVE-2020-25688High confidence
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0
Unknown · rhacm
3.5LowCVSS 3.1
Scheduled
Fix not verifiedLow technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityLow→Operational priority:Low, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Unknown rhacm and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verified01
What, why and how
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.
What
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.
Why
The product uses a hard-coded, unchangeable cryptographic key.
How
An attacker operating through the affected interface may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.
Why
The product uses a hard-coded, unchangeable cryptographic key.
How
An attacker operating through the affected interface may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- the affected interface → Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Unspecified
- Privileges required
- Low: a basic authenticated account is required
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-321 ↗
CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key. The product uses a hard-coded, unchangeable cryptographic key.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVAdjacentAttack vector: The attacker must be on an adjacent or logically close network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CLowConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.INoneIntegrity impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix not verified
- Affected
- rhacm: All rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0
- Fixed
- No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- Action
- No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. Limit untrusted access and use least privilege until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 23 Nov 2020 · Last source change 4 Aug 2024, 15:40 UTC · CWE-321 · Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceNIST NVD
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2020-18350
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment
Missing structured fields: affected product. Missing data is not evidence of low risk; review the primary advisory.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.