Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 1.38% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceprojectcontour · contour
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-MJP8-X484-PM3R ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch availableIn Contour ( Ingress controller for Kubernetes) before version 1.7.0, a bad actor can shut down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. GET requests to /shutdown on port 8090 of the Envoy pod initiate Envoy's shutdown procedure. The shutdown procedure includes flipping the readiness endpoint to false, which removes Envoy from the routing pool. When running Envoy (For example on the host network, pod spec hostNetwork=true), the shutdown manager's endpoint is accessible to anyone on the network that can reach the Kubernetes node that's running Envoy. There is no authentication in place that prevents a rogue actor on the network from shutting down Envoy via the shutdown manager endpoint. Successful exploitation of this issue will lead to bad actors shutting down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. This is fixed in version 1.7.0.
In Contour ( Ingress controller for Kubernetes) before version 1.7.0, a bad actor can shut down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. GET requests to /shutdown on port 8090 of the Envoy pod initiate Envoy's shutdown procedure. The shutdown procedure includes flipping the readiness endpoint to false, which removes Envoy from the routing pool. When running Envoy (For example on the host network, pod spec hostNetwork=true), the shutdown manager's endpoint is accessible to anyone on the network that can reach the Kubernetes node that's running Envoy. There is no authentication in place that prevents a rogue actor on the network from shutting down Envoy via the shutdown manager endpoint. Successful exploitation of this issue will lead to bad actors shutting down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. This is fixed in version 1.7.0.
A security-sensitive function is reachable without the authentication check that should protect it.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
In Contour ( Ingress controller for Kubernetes) before version 1.7.0, a bad actor can shut down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. GET requests to /shutdown on port 8090 of the Envoy pod initiate Envoy's shutdown procedure. The shutdown procedure includes flipping the readiness endpoint to false, which removes Envoy from the routing pool. When running Envoy (For example on the host network, pod spec hostNetwork=true), the shutdown manager's endpoint is accessible to anyone on the network that can reach the Kubernetes node that's running Envoy. There is no authentication in place that prevents a rogue actor on the network from shutting down Envoy via the shutdown manager endpoint. Successful exploitation of this issue will lead to bad actors shutting down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. This is fixed in version 1.7.0.
A security-sensitive function is reachable without the authentication check that should protect it.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 5 Aug 2020 · Last source change 4 Aug 2024, 13:08 UTC · CWE-306 · Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.