Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
- EPSS is 2.02% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2019
CVE-2017-13718High confidence
Affected product: security vulnerability
Unknown · Unknown
8.0HighCVSS 3.0
Within 7 days
Fix not verifiedHigh technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityHigh→Operational priority:Critical, raised one band.upgradedsince 5 Aug 2024
Compensating controls
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Increase monitoring for the attack path and post-exploitation behaviour described in the report.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Unknown Unknown and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
High technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verified01
What, why and how
The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device's port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called "rodman" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router's HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker's website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device's server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to "*", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device.
What
The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device's port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called "rodman" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router's HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker's website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device's server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to "*", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may obtain information outside the intended access boundary.
What
The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device's port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called "rodman" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router's HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker's website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device's server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to "*", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may obtain information outside the intended access boundary.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material Reference recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → vulnerable operation → obtain information outside the intended access boundary
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- Low: a basic authenticated account is required
- User interaction
- Required interaction required
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-254 ↗
CWE-254. Open the MITRE definition for the exact weakness description.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UIRequiredUser interaction: Another user must perform an action for exploitation to succeed.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- Stolen credentials, tokens and legitimate administration functions may provide continued access without deploying a large custom toolset.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix not verified
- Affected
- n/a
- Fixed
- No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- Action
- No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 10 Jun 2019 · Last source change 5 Aug 2024, 19:05 UTC · CWE-254
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceNIST NVD
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-09-01
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2017-5235
Product sourceUnavailable
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceNIST NVD
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment
Missing structured fields: affected product. Missing data is not evidence of low risk; review the primary advisory.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- ENISA EUVD mappingEUVD-2017-5235 was added to the official ENISA EUVD mapping for this CVE.ENISA EUVD ↗
- Before
- not recorded
- After
- {"euvdId":"EUVD-2017-5235"}
- Public exploit evidencePublic exploit evidence changed from No public exploit to Public exploit reference.github.com ↗
- Before
- No public exploit
- After
- Public exploit reference
- SeveritySeverity changed from Unknown to High.NIST NVD ↗
- Before
- Unknown
- After
- High
- CVSS scoreCVSS score changed from not recorded to 8.0 (CVSS 3.0 · NIST NVD · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).NIST NVD ↗
- Before
- not recorded
- After
- 8.0 (CVSS 3.0 · NIST NVD · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- Catalogue recordCVE added to the BlackTree catalogue.CNA ↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.