Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 35.58% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2013
CVE-2013-0169High confidence
Affected product: security vulnerability
Unknown · Unknown
2.6LowCVSS 2.0
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Fix availability varies by productLow technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 2 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityLow→Operational priority:Low, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Apply the linked authoritative mitigation while planning the permanent fix.
- Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Unknown Unknown and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 2 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
- ABB Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT): 2 affected or under-investigation product states without a fixed product state in the same current advisory
Distribution package intelligence
16 package statesRelease-specific package status
Debian findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian trixietrixie · source | bouncycastle | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.48+dfsg-2 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian trixietrixie · source | gnutls28 | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.0.22-3 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian trixietrixie · source | nss | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 2:3.14.3-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian trixietrixie · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.0.1e-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | bouncycastle | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.48+dfsg-2 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | gnutls28 | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.0.22-3 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | nss | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 2:3.14.3-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.0.1e-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | bouncycastle | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.48+dfsg-2 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | gnutls28 | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.0.22-3 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | nss | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 2:3.14.3-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.0.1e-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | bouncycastle | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.48+dfsg-2 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | gnutls28 | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.0.22-3 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | nss | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 2:3.14.3-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.0.1e-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 22 Oct 2026 |
Direct vendor intelligence
1 currentAuthoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
2NGA002579 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 1 · finalABB Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)CVE-2013-0169
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
- ABB M2M Gateway ARM600, firmware versions >=4.1.2|<=5.0.3
- ABB M2M Gateway SW, software versions >=5.0.1|<=5.0.3
- Summary
- TLS protocol version 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2 do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue.
- Remediation
- Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 2 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product01
What, why and how
The TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue.
What
The TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through the affected interface may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
The TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through the affected interface may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- the affected interface → vulnerable operation → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Unspecified
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- Not stated in the selected CVSS metric
- Attack complexity
- High: exploitation depends on specific conditions
- Security boundary
- Not stated in the selected CVSS metric
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-310 ↗
CWE-310. Open the MITRE definition for the exact weakness description.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix availability varies by product
- Affected
- Action
- Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
- Workaround
- Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).
Official vendor articles1 stored document
Linked articles are downloaded and versioned as source evidence. A CVE mention or approved update relationship does not, by itself, verify a fix for every product branch.
- About the security content of Java for OS X 2013-001 and Mac OS X v10.6 Update 13 - Apple Support →Original publisher ↗Searchable text snapshot · Captured 18 Oct 2026Apple Store Mac iPad iPhone Watch Vision AirPods Home Entertainment Accessories Support 0 + "},{"name":"compact","assetInline":" "}],"analyticsAttributes":[{"name":"data-analytics-title","value":"apple home"}]},{"id":"ad4a2a26eb4836393385e9f6c61b526b4a3cb31409c5ed8730ce7a704dd7132f","name":"store","text":"
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 8 Feb 2013 · Last source change 6 Aug 2024, 14:18 UTC · CWE-310
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceNIST NVD
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-09-13
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2013-0208
Product sourceVendor CSAF · ABB Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · ABB Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)
CWE sourceNIST NVD
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment
Missing structured fields: affected product. Missing data is not evidence of low risk; review the primary advisory.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- ENISA EUVD mappingEUVD-2013-0208 was added to the official ENISA EUVD mapping for this CVE.ENISA EUVD ↗
- Before
- not recorded
- After
- {"euvdId":"EUVD-2013-0208"}
- Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added vendor advisory: openssl.org/secadv_20130204.txt; added vendor advisory: polarssl.org/polarssl-1.2.5-released; removed vendor advisory: debian.org/dsa-2621; removed vendor advisory: debian.org/dsa-2622; 22 further removals.openssl.org ↗
- Before
- vendor advisory: debian.org/dsa-2621 · vendor advisory: debian.org/dsa-2622 · vendor advisory: lists.apple.com/msg00002.html · 21 more references
- After
- vendor advisory: openssl.org/secadv_20130204.txt · vendor advisory: polarssl.org/polarssl-1.2.5-released
- SeveritySeverity changed from Unknown to Low.NIST NVD ↗
- Before
- Unknown
- After
- Low
- CVSS scoreCVSS score changed from not recorded to 2.6 (CVSS 2.0 · NIST NVD · AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N).NIST NVD ↗
- Before
- not recorded
- After
- 2.6 (CVSS 2.0 · NIST NVD · AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)
- Catalogue recordCVE added to the BlackTree catalogue.CNA ↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.